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"Rights" in the Federal Administrative
State
Jerry L. Mashaw-t
It is a first principle of American constitutionalism that the ultimate
non-violent protection of individual rights from governmental encroach-
ment resides in an independent judiciary. A similar ideal of "judicial re-
view" permeates American administrative law. In the end, the citizen, in-
deed any "person," it is thought, may call administrators to account in
court and thereby protect his, her, or its rights. This Article explores a
group of related developments that suggest the extremely fragile character
of that judicial protection. These converging clusters of cases illustrate the
basic dependence of the judiciary on the legislative and administrative
branches of government for the very conception of law that animates judi-
cial judgment. And, if that is true, then an activist state-a state that em-
phasizes the administration of social and economic life in pursuit of collec-
tive ends-will tend to redefine rights in ways that de-emphasize
individual legal remedies. In such a state, the judiciary will ultimately
adopt what I shall term here a "statist" conception of legal rights and
legal personality, that is, a conception crucially dependent for its content
on legislative definitions of public welfare and on the organizational im-
peratives of the state's administrative-governmental apparatus.
This story is hardly novel. The Supreme Court's ratification of state
social legislation and of the New Deal signaled the jurisprudential rejec-
tion of the classical liberal ideal of an autonomous private domain of
"property" and "liberty." 1 And administrative law's attempted redefini-
tion of individual rights in terms of procedural protections or substantive
claims on "new property" perhaps never misled those who have consis-
tently focused on the "inherent contradictions" of liberalism.2 Yet, it
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. The Court's invalidation of social legislation during the pre-New Deal era was premised on the
notion that there existed a social compact, or unwritten constitution, which created legally cognizable
natural rights reserved to the people within the private domain. See Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928). Beginning with Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court eroded these natural law boundaries on government
action past recognition by approving crucial New Deal legislation, such as the Fair Labor Standards
Act in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and the Agricultural Adjustment Act in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2. For examples of such critiques, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); R. UNGER,
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976); M. HORWITZ, THE
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seems useful to review how far we have moved in the 1970's, indeed since
the mid-1970's, to consolidate a federal common law that emphasizes a
statist conception of legal personality and legal rights. For it is essentially
in this period that a conservative Supreme Court has rationalized and ex-
tended the jurisprudence of the activist state to make explicit conclusions
that were merely implicit in earlier legal doctrine. Indeed, but a decade
earlier, a quite different, individualistic and court-centered, federal juris-
prudence might have been imagined to be the norm.
In looking at this particular period in American administrative law and
then backward and forward to bracket it in related historical develop-
ments, I shall surely lapse into generalizations from particular examples
that are, to say the least, deeply problematic. The reader should keep in
mind, therefore, the motivation for this excursion. I am attempting to ex-
plain why certain doctrinal developments that seemed critically important
in the early 1970's-indeed that seemed to provide the central images of
rights in an increasingly administrative state-now seem the relics of a
bygone era. I want, moreover, to offer an explanation that focuses, not on
general political or social movements, or on shifts in the personnel and
personal philosophies of the Supreme Court, but rather on the intellectual
structure of our dominant conceptions of rights. From the perspective of
the 1980's, we can see that it is these conceptions, in part legacies of the
legitimation of the New Deal, that the jurisprudence of the 1960's and
early 1970's failed to displace.
I. The Rights in Question
Having apologized in advance, let me try to capture the essence of
"rights" in American administrative law by discussing the Supreme
Court's doctrinal approach to three categories of interests: (1) the right to
participate in administrative decisionmaking, (2) the right to call officials
to account in court for the legality of their actions, and (3) the right to sue
to enforce liberty and property interests established, but only partially im-
plemented or protected, by governmental entities. In American adminis-
trative law the doctrine elaborating these interests presents a distinctive
vision of rights-holding and rights-definition, of the relationship between
private persons and officials, and of the role of courts in shaping that
relationship. For our present purposes the presentation of a pair of ab-
stract and sharply contrasting conceptual approaches is sufficient to high-
light the fundamental choices that the Court has made.
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed.
1982); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979); Tay-
lor, Deconstructing the Law, I YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 158 (1982); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
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Consider first a model that shall be referred to as the "individualistic"
conception of rights. Here citizen participation in public decisionmaking
and official accounting for public decisions are available on demand from
courts, which view statutes and regulations as but one source of public
common law. From this perspective legislative and administrative law-
making are meant to be integrated through judicial action into the set of
property and liberty interests available to those who invoke the courts'
jurisdiction. Participation and accounting rights inhere in the legal sys-
tem's basic conceptions of property, citizenship, or legal personality. Judi-
cial remedies largely constitute and independently structure the governing
conception of law. Although legal rights and legal identity here obviously
depend upon judicial action, the governing judicial norms are rooted in
ideas of private ordering. Those ideas emphasize autonomy and consent,
and they are "administered" by judges whose independent jurisdiction and
status are both constitutionally assured and constitutionally limited.
The contrasting rights structure is one that permits participation only
in aid of official action; calls officials to account for their official acts only
to the extent that legislation establishes special processes for that purpose;
and views legislation and its implementation as the province of non-judi-
cial, public officials. Judicial jurisdiction is special, legislatively pre-
scribed, and strictly construed. Private attempts to enforce the putative
protections or benefits of public law by means of litigation are generally
deemed inconsistent with the state's need for centralized administration to
achieve public purposes. The "purposes of the state" provide both the cen-
tral tenets of legal interpretation and the sources of previously unspecified
legal norms. This model represents the "statist" conception of rights.
These abstract conceptions are not so much opposites as extreme ten-
dencies in legal orders having similar institutions and material conditions.
But the general tendency of the legal order is a powerful engine for shap-
ing its development. To the extent that there is a recognizable legal order,
it exists because we can identify some set of reasonably coherent general
ideas that seem to underlie particular laws or legal decisions. In non-
revolutionary times, legal development involves analogical extension of
those ideas.3 A legal order that views legislation, administration, and per-
3. In recent years emphasis on so-called "rules of recognition," cultural, psychological and other
determinants of what we select as meaningful, has become commonplace, particularly within the social
sciences and philosophy. For the social sciences, see C. GEER'rZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in
Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOL-
OGY 167 (1983); C. GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973); C. GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in
id. at 412. In philosophy, work has centered around speech-act theory. See, e.g., J. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS (1969); S. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). Quentin Skinner has applied
speech-act theory to more social scientific themes. E.g., Skinner, Conventions and Understanding of
Speech Acts, 20 PHIL. Q. 118 (1970); Skinner, Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought
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haps all of "public law" as "special," and that, therefore, analogizes from
the "general" case of private ordering supported by judicial dispute reso-
lution, will develop quite differently than a legal order that reverses the
institutional attributes it considers "special" and "general."
II. The Individualist Model
The former, individualist legal order is almost perfectly exemplified by
three cases reported in volume 397 of the United States Reports. These
cases, all decided in early 1970, crystallized a jurisprudence on hearing
rights,4 standing,5 and private enforcement of public law6 that had been
developing for at least a decade.
A. Goldberg v. Kelly
Goldberg7 concerned both the definition of property and the institutions
through which particular property holdings are determined. Its narrow
issue was whether the state may terminate certain welfare benefits before
holding a hearing on the appropriateness of termination. Terminated wel-
fare recipients claimed that the statutes and regulations, which allowed
them a hearing only after the termination, deprived them of property
without due process of law.
One obvious approach to this question would be to ask how the relevant
legislation and regulations define the welfare claimants' interests and what
processes they provide to adjudicate claims. Upon finding that the recipi-
ents' property interests, so defined, do not include continuation of pay-
ments pending resolution of disputes and that the state had employed the
appropriate administrative process to determine eligibility, the Court
would dismiss the case. But that, just as obviously, is not the Goldberg
approach. Instead, the Court reached out to adopt Charles Reich's anal-
ogy of statutory to common law property." The special statutory limita-
tions or restrictions on welfare property are submerged by the more gen-
eral idea-emanating both from common law and many other statutory
schemes-that holders of property may not be divested of their rights ex-
cept by adjudication in a form resembling a civil trial.
The Court did not ignore the statutory origins of the property involved,
and Action, 2 POL. THEORY 277 (1974). For an application of these ideas to law, see Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
4. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (ADAPSO).
6. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
7. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
8. See id. at 262 n.8 (citing Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965), and Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964));
id. at 265 n.13 (citing Reich, supra, 74 YALE L.J. at 1255).
1132
Vol. 92: 1129, 1983
HeinOnline -- 92 Yale L.J. 1132 1982-1983
Rights in the Administrative State
nor did it divest administrative jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it clearly inte-
grated both the statutory scheme and the administrative process into an
independent and more general conception of property and fairness-the
constitutional common law of due process. Having used entitlements lan-
guage in one section of the statute, Congress will not be heard to deny the
customary implications of that language in another. Administrative imple-
mentation remained the norm, but agencies were required to treat individ-
ual claimants as rights-bearers whose claims had to be assessed before a
(nearly) neutral tribunal.
B. ADAPSO
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations (ADAPSO) v.
Camp9 reinterprets "standing" doctrine in a quite similar fashion. The
petitioner objected to a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency permit-
ting national banks to sell their excess computer capacity in competition
with its members. It invoked in support of its claim a statute prohibiting
banks from engaging in non-banking activity. The Comptroller moved to
dismiss the action on the ground that the statute in question was designed
to protect the general integrity of the banking system and thus provided
no right to competitors, such as ADAPSO's members, to be free from
bank competition. Given that Congress had enacted no special statutes en-
abling competitors to attack his orders in court, the Comptroller argued
that ADAPSO lacked standing to sue.10
Although the Comptroller's arguments tracked conventional standing
doctrine, they did not prevail. The Supreme Court approached the case
from the perspective of a general right to judicial review. The Comptroller
thus put the question in the wrong way. The issue was not whether Con-
gress had specifically intended to give ADAPSO a right to review. It was
instead whether ADAPSO's members could be considered as "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated""1 by the relevant
statute. If so, then they would lack standing to sue only if they were in
fact unaffected by the Comptroller's action or Congress had specifically
prohibited suits of the sort in question.
While suggesting that its redefinition of the right to call public officials
to account emerged non-problematically from the Administrative Proce-
dure Act,1 2 the ADAPSO Court was instead crystallizing a common law
of judicial review that viewed the right as general rather than special.
Professor Jaffe had argued eloquently for such a presumptive right of
9. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
10. Id. at 151; see id. at 154.
11. Id. at 153.
12. Id. at 153-54 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (amended 1976)).
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review in his 1965 treatise1" and traced its common law origins to as early
as 1902.14 The Court noted that "[W]here statutes are concerned, the
trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest ad-
ministrative action."'" Henceforth, apparently, all statutes would be
viewed as forming a part of that "trend," unless specific provisions were
inserted to the contrary.
C. Rosado v. Wyman
Rosadol' is less a part of the common intellectual baggage of contempo-
rary lawyers than is Goldberg or ADAPSO, but it is no less important.
There New York welfare recipients sued the State Commissioner of Social
Services, claiming that New York had violated the United States Constitu-
tion and a federal statutory condition attached to federal grants-in-aid of
state payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program by failing properly to adjust its standard of need for
purposes of computing welfare eligibility. The issue principally before the
Court was whether the federal courts should retain "pendent" jurisdiction
over the statutory claim after the constitutional claim that had formed the
predicate for federal jurisdiction had been decided against the plaintiffs.
The Court's decision that pendent jurisdiction could be maintained was an
important strategic victory in the battle for "welfare rights," but two other
issues, one of which was ignored by the Court, are of more interest to this
discussion.
The first issue involves the basic theory of the plaintiffs' claim. The
obligation that they sought to impose on New York involved a condition
on the latter's acceptance of federal funds under Title IV of the Social
Security Act.' That New York owed an obligation to the United States
not to violate this condition seems straightforward. But whence arose the
claimants' right to enforce compliance? Their only relationship to the Ti-
tle IV program was as recipients under a state statutory program that
happened to be funded in part by federal funds.
A possible answer was 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of
action for deprivation of rights guaranteed under the Constitution or any
federal statute. But this answer was both inappropriate and incomplete. It
was inappropriate because it would have anticipated by ten years an in-
terpretation of section 1983 that extends its reach beyond "civil rights"
13. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 336-53 (1965).
14. Id. at 339 (citing School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902)).
15. 397 U.S. at 154.
16. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1976).
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legislation,"8 and because section 1983 is never mentioned in Rosado as
the basis for the plaintiffs' claims. It was incomplete because section 1983
itself provides no rights.19 The right must first be found in the Constitu-
tion or in a statute. Yet the Rosado Court seemed convinced beyond any
need for discussion of these issues that third-party beneficiaries of federal
legislation governing the conduct of state officials have a right to judicial
enforcement of statutory obligations, provided that federal court jurisdic-
tion (here pendent) exists.
Rosado is thus the heir of another 1960's case, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,20
as well as an important companion to ADAPSO. Borak allows benefi-
ciaries of federal securities legislation to enforce that legislation by means
of an action for damages or an injunction when they are harmed by con-
duct violating the federal statute or regulations implementing it. Ex-
tending this form of third-party-beneficiary enforcement to federal grant-
in-aid programs means that when federal policies are implemented by
state administrators, the ADAPSO presumption of reviewability applies.
Rosado thus integrates the remedial system for grant-in-aid programs
with the remedial system ADAPSO establishes for federal legislation gen-
erally. Each system has at its core a presumption that judicial remedies
are available whenever official actions adversely affect private interests.
This interpretation of Rosado is strengthened by the Court's explicit
rejection of New York's claim that even if judicial jurisdiction potentially
existed it had nevertheless been ousted by the primary enforcement juris-
diction of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).
The Court recognized that there was a complex statutory and regulatory
scheme for HEW determination of state non-compliance with federal con-
ditions and for departmental withdrawal of federal support. It recognized
further that a judicial finding of non-compliance and an order to the state
to cease utilizing federal funds would have similar effects. 21 But, the
Court noted, citing ADAPSO, "We are most reluctant to assume Con-
gress has closed the avenue to effective judicial review to those individuals
18. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
19. It simply states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This section is remedial in nature. See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
20. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
21. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1970).
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most directly affected by the administration of its program. ' That there
was a special administrative process to enforce state compliance did not, of
itself, limit the general idea that the beneficiaries of federal statutory
rights could enforce those rights in court.
D. On the Margin of Volume 397
Goldberg, ADAPSO, and Rosado, particularly the former two, were
hailed as the fruition of historic trends in the jurisprudence of administra-
tive law-trends towards openness, participation, accountability, and the
protection of individual rights. The cases seemed to confirm the abandon-
ment of distinctions between common law rights and statutory privileges
that commentators recently had pronounced dead.2" Ideas of legal identity
or personality were said to have matured to the point where we could now
accept the inevitability of increased collective action without inhibiting,
indeed while fostering, our historic sense that legal security-the rule of
law-inhered in the ability to pursue judicial remedies for the invasions of
individual rights. All that had been needed was a new vision of rights that
included those important interests and protections that had been emerging
for half a century in the fabric of federal statutes and regulations. 4
In the early 1970's, these ideas were elaborated and extended, espe-
cially by the Courts of Appeals. Participation rights were confirmed with
respect to a wide range of administrative actions affecting individual pri-
vate interests and were even extended by analogy to arenas of administra-
tive policy choice affecting the public at large. By 1975, Richard Stewart
could describe the "reformed" view of administrative law as the "interest
representation model"-something of a combination of pluralist politics
and the forms of civil trial.2 5 Many of the paradigmatic instances of this
model emerged from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. It, for example, invented "hybrid" rulemaking,26 which entailed
hearings on contested issues of fact, and so limited ex parte contacts in
rulemaking that it cast in doubt the legality of administrators taking pol-
icy advice from their own staffs,2 7 except in proceedings open to all inter-
22. Id. at 420.
23. Van AIstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968).
24. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW (1978).
25. Stewart, The Refoirnation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
26. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417
U.S. 964 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009
(D.C. Cir. 1971); see Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975) (discussing these and other "notice-
and-comment-plus" cases).
27. See Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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ested persons.
The sources of these new participatory rights were obscure, but in-
triguing. To some degree they emerged as an articulation of ideas of "fair-
ness" closely associated with conventional adversary proceedings. But
more often they were linked to the need to produce an adequate record for
appellate judicial review.28 Such review would be occasioned, of course, by
the requests of these same participating private parties pursuant to broad
statutory grants and liberal judicial interpretations of standing. In this
way, presumptive judicial review was made more effective by increased
participation. The two rights became mutually reinforcing aspects of a
judicial campaign to broaden access to and increase the accountability of
administrative processes.
For a time the requirement of "standing" seemed destined for oblivion.
A lawsuit apparently concocted to seek out the boundaries of the ex-
panded concept could not find them.2" Meanwhile, third-party-beneficiary
suits of the Borak or Rosado type flooded, and were accepted by, the
lower federal courts.30 Nor were the courts alone in exalting private rights
at the expense of bureaucratic discretion. The Freedom of Information
Act" and the Privacy Act32 gave all citizens "property rights" in the in-
formation held by government bureaus. Amendments to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act3s and to federal court jurisdictional statutes 4 elimi-
nated troublesome barriers to judicial review other than standing. And
regulatory statutes enacted during this period almost inevitably included
broad standing provisions;3 5 immediate, "pre-enforcement" review of
agency rules;36 and often "citizens suit" clauses permitting any person to
28. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
29. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)
(SCRAP).
30. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
31. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)), requires federal agencies to make available to the public any
written information in their possession unless specifically exempted.
32. The Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1982)), permits individuals on whom files are kept by federal agencies to participate in the use,
review, and disposal of their files. For discussions of the Act, see Hanus & Relyea, A Policy Assess-
ment of the Privacy Act of 1974, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 555 (1976); Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An
Overview, 1976 DUKE L.J. 301.
33. Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703).
34. Id. (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1391(e)).
35. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a) (1982) ("any person may
file a petition for judicial review"); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2060
(1982) (conferring standing on "consumers and consumer organizations," as well as on aggrieved
parties); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1982) (conferring
standing on "[alny person adversely affected or aggrieved"); see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATSE § 24:4, at 221-22 (2d ed. 1983).
36. See Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2060 (1982) ("Not later than 60
days after a consumer product safety rule is promulgated by the Commission . . .any consumer or
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enforce administrative regulations."7
III. Something Happened
I cannot identify the precise moment of the mid-1970's shift away from
individualist and toward statist conceptions of rights. Indeed, it seems
plausible to find the analytic and rhetorical potential for such a shift in
cases like Goldberg, ADAPSO, and Rosado themselves. I will suggest as
much somewhat later when I come to consider whether the volume 397
cases were part of a "trend, 3 as the Court suggested in ADAPSO, or
were merely a wave in the more general trend toward statist legal ideol-
ogy, perceptible since the 1930's. Nevertheless, the approach to the recog-
nition and definition of the three rights we have been considering began to
change.
A. The Right to Participate
Wayne Kennedy was a field representative in the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO). He publicly charged that his supervisor, one
Verduin, had offered a bribe, in the form of an OEO grant, to members of
a community service organization. The supervisor removed him from the
federal service, pursuant to the Lloyd-LaFollette (Civil Service) Act,
which provided that Kennedy was removable only for "such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service." 9 The Act provided Kennedy a right
to an informal pre-termination hearing on the "good cause" issue before
his station chief, in this case Verduin. Kennedy understandably objected to
that procedure and requested instead a formal hearing before an impartial
hearing officer. When the requested procedure was refused, Kennedy filed
suit arguing that his due process rights under Goldberg had been violated.
In the leading opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy,"0 fully subscribed to by
only three Justices, Justice Rehnquist recognized that Kennedy's right to
be removed only for "cause" was some sort of statutory interest. Yet, it
was not in Rehnquist's view an interest recognizable as "property" for
purposes of due process. He noted that
the very section of the statute which granted [Kennedy] that right
• ..expressly provided also for the procedure by which "cause" was
consumer organization, may file a petition . . . for judicial review of such rule.").
37. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976 & Supp. V
1981), for example, state that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf ...
against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of [any] standard or limitation under this
chapter." Virtually every environmental statute passed since 1970 has a similar provision.
38. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982).
40. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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to be determined, and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees
which [he] insists are mandated by the Constitution.
Here the property interest which [Kennedy] had in his employ-
ment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had
accompanied the grant of that interest."1
Kennedy was advised that he had to take the "bitter with the sweet."'42
Five members of the Court objected43 that this approach had been re-
jected in Goldberg and in other cases upon which Justice Rehnquist's
opinion relied. Two of the five concurred 44 in the judgment, however, on
the ground that the Lloyd-LaFollette Act procedures were sufficient under
the Goldberg formula. Yet within two years a majority of the Court, in
Bishop v. Wood,45 subscribed to the view that "[a] property interest in
employment can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied
contract . . . . Whether such a guarantee has been given can be deter-
mined only by an examination of the particular statute or ordinance in
question."'46 The Bishop majority characterized as "remarkably innova-
tive"47 the suggestions in one dissenting opinion that the existence of a
property interest sufficient to require due process protection was a matter
for independent judicial determination. The majority was committed to
the proposition that there was no federal "common law" of property.48
Nor was this commitment limited to employment cases. In Paul v. Da-
vis,49 the Court considered whether police circulation of respondent's
name and photograph on a list of "active shoplifters" branded him a crim-
inal without due process of law. (Davis had once been charged with shop-
lifting, but the charges were dropped prior to trial.) Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, held that there was no property or liberty interest
in reputation. To be sure, numerous cases had suggested that reputation
was a protected interest under the due process clause, but all those cases
(save one) were explained away as involving reputational harm that ag-
gravated the deprivation of some independent right guaranteed by state
law.
50
41. Id. at 152, 155.
42. Id. at 154.
43. Id. at 164 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring); id. at 206 (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting).
44. Id. at 164 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
45. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Justices Stevens and Powell formed this majority by joining the Chief
Justice and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart in this new approach to property interests.
46. Id. at 344-45.
47. Id. at 349 n.14.
48. Id.
49. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
50. Id. at 699-712.
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The dissenters in Paul v. Davis5 were horrified both by the majority's
cavalier treatment of precedent and by the implications of the ruling. To
Justice Brennan,
The logical and disturbing corollary of this holding is that no due
process infirmities would inhere in a statute constituting a commis-
sion to conduct ex parte trials of individuals, so long as the only
official judgment pronounced was limited to the public condemnation
and branding of a person as a Communist, a traitor, an "active mur-
derer," a homosexual, or any other mark that "merely" carries social
opprobrium.52
Yet, by 1978 Justice Brennan himself could not locate property rights
for due process purposes without the assistance of state law. When auto-
mobile dealers and their franchisees complained of arbitrary suspension of
their right to locate or relocate dealerships in California, Justice Brennan
replied that "General Motors had no interest in franchising that was im-
mune from state regulation."53 And speaking of a stop order allegedly
issued without the necessary constitutional safeguards, he continued, "The
Board's notice served only to inform appellee . . . of this [state regulation]
and to advise it of the status, pending the Board's determination, of its
franchise permit applications." '54 The "advice" of the Board was, of
course, that appellees could not locate or relocate their business for up to
eighteen months-advice, which, under the relevant statute, was given au-
tomatically and ex parte whenever any competitor requested it.
In the same Term the Court called an abrupt halt to the District of
Columbia Circuit's insistence on "hybrid" rulemaking proceedings.55 The
Court of Appeals was instructed that it had "seriously misread or misap-
plied" ' the relevant statutory and decisional law. Moreover, the District
of Columbia Circuit's demand for adversarial participation to produce an
adequate record for judicial review, said the Supreme Court, "fundamen-
tally misconceives the nature of the standard for judicial review of an
agency rule."'57 The mutually reinforcing linkage of the right to partici-
pate and the right to judicial review was then severed. The adequacy of
the record, said the Court, "turns on whether the agency has followed the
51. Id. at 714 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
52. Id. at 721.
53. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 105 (1978).
54. Id.
55. See supra p. 1136.
56. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519,
525 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.).
57. Id. at 547.
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statutory mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act or other relevant
statutes.""8
B. Standing to Sue
The post-ADAPSO standing cases have not so much abandoned its
"zone of interests" analysis as rendered the relevance of that analysis
problematic. For the standing cases of the 1970's, while restricting access
to the courts, have emphasized "causality" and "nexus" concerns that
seem related more to the existence of an injury, or to the relationship of
the relief requested to the mitigation of the injury alleged, than to the
question of what classes of persons may call officials to judicial account.
Yet even this is unclear; for the cases certainly insist that two broad cate-
gories of persons-citizens and taxpayers-do not by virtue of that status
alone have standing to pursue the interests of citizens and taxpayers. Nor
may persons having material or other interests conferring standing to liti-
gate certain issues raise grounds of illegality relating to the protection of
separable interests not their own.
This line of cases begins with Sierra Club v. Morton.5 The Club
sought to enjoin certain leases and other proposed developments in aid of
the leases on national forest lands in California. Although requested to do
so, the Club never alleged that its members had used or ever would use
the land in question for pursuits inconsistent with the proposed projects.
It urged its standing to sue instead on the basis of its long record of inter-
est in and defense of our national heritage."0 The Supreme Court denied
the Club standing on the ground that it had failed to allege that it or its
members had sustained or would sustain any injury. This failure exdu.ded
judicial jurisdiction on Article III grounds. There had been no allegation
of a concrete case or controversy.
Because Sierra Club imposed a seemingly innocuous barrier to standing
and reconfirmed the Court's disposition to recognize aesthetic, environ-
mental, recreational, and other interests, it was perceived either as insig-
nificant or perhaps as a further confirmation of the "trend" toward liber-
alized standing.61 But, imbedded in the Sierra Club opinion's commitment
to the "injury-in-fact" requirement was a complex set of questions con-
cerning what would distinguish an abstract interest in official accountabil-
ity from a concrete injury giving rise to a right to call officials to account.
Moreover, those questions seemed to be of constitutional dimension.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
60. Id. at 736.
61. See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645,
677 (1973).
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The following Term the Court confronted Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,"'
a suit by an unwed mother complaining of Texas officials' systematic re-
fusal to enforce the state's criminal child support statute. The Court con-
cluded that the plaintiff failed to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement of
Sierra Club:
[W]e hold that. . . appellant has failed to allege a sufficient nexus
between her injury and the government action. . . . To be sure, ap-
pellant no doubt suffered an injury stemming from the failure of her
child's father to contribute support payments. But the bare existence
of an abstract injury meets only the first half of the standing require-
ment ....
Here, appellant has made no showing that her failure to secure
support payments results from the nonenforcement, as to her child's
father, of [the Texas statute] . . ..
The Court labelled "speculative"" the prospect that enforcement of the
statute would result in future payments to the child.
Two cases decided the next Term look in the same direction. United
States v. Richardson6" involved a challenge to the section of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act that permits the agency to account for its funds
solely by a certificate of its Director that they have been properly spent.
Richardson filed suit as a federal taxpayer alleging that the Act violated
the accounts clause of the Constitution, which provides in part that "a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time."6 The Court con-
cluded that Richardson did not have standing because he was not chal-
lenging the expenditure of public funds, which might cause him injury as
a taxpayer, but only the lack of an accounting. He had thus failed to
demonstrate a sufficient nexus between his taxpayer status and the consti-
tutional claim urged. Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War,67 the Court found insufficient nexus between the injury to
the plaintiffs' interest, as citizens and taxpayers, in the faithful discharge
by Congressmen of their legislative duties and the plaintiffs' legal claim
that retention by Congressmen of military status as reserve officers vio-
lated the appointments clause, which provides that "no Person holding
any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
62. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
63. Id. at 617-18.
64. Id. at 618.
65. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 7.
67. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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during his Continuance in Office." 8
The approach in these cases is puzzling when compared with that of
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP),69 decided in the same Term as Linda R.S. In SCRAP, the
plaintiffs, a group of law students, challenged a ruling of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), allowing railroads to exact a surcharge on
existing freight rates pending the adoption of selective rate increases. They
claimed that the rate surcharge would discourage shipment and use of
recyclable goods and thereby contribute to the degradation of the environ-
ment in the Washington, D.C., area, an area in which they used the for-
ests, streams, mountains, and other resources for recreation and sightsee-
ing. Over the objections of the railroads and the ICC, the Court found
these allegations of injury sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss:
In interpreting "injury in fact" we made it clear [in Sierra Club]
that standing was not confined to those who could show "economic
harm," although both Data Processing [ADAPSO] and Barlow [a
companion case] had involved that kind of injury. Nor, we said,
could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be sufficient
reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency's action any
person who had in fact suffered injury. Rather, we explained: "Aes-
thetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the
fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many
rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal pro-
tection through the judicial process." . . . Consequently, neither the
fact that the appellees here claimed only a harm to their use and
enjoyment of the natural resources of the Washington area, nor the
fact that all those who use those resources suffered the same harm,
deprives them of standing.
70
These cases are susceptible to several analyses. One is that the Court
was rethinking the standing question and had determined, despite the ap-
parently lenient approach in SCRAP, that the courts should screen out
substantively doubtful claims (as a matter of prudent judicial administra-
tion) on the basis of a preliminary objection to standing. A second analysis
might suggest that these cases are classic examples of the confusion of
"standing" with other aspects of "justiciability." Linda R.S. raised a claim
related to "prosecutorial discretion"; Richardson challenged activity in the
perennially sensitive area of national security; and Schlesinger involved a
collateral attack on the qualifications of members of the legislative
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
69. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
70. Id. at 686-87 (citation omitted).
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branch.71 A third explanation, suggested by Justice Powell's concurrence
in Richardson, was that the Court was becoming generally concerned
about the appropriateness under Article III of entertaining lawsuits in
which "political" issues predominate. The Court described the Richardson
plaintiff as seeking to employ "'a federal court as a forum in which to air
his generalized grievances about the conduct of the government.' ",7" And
the Court in Schlesinger said, "[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated
upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is held in common by all
members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the
injury all citizens share."
'7 4
Justice Stewart, however, read at least Richardson differently.7" He
viewed that case as based directly on an interpretation of Article III, and
he expressed alarm about what it might foreshadow. Stewart posed, as an
example, the question of the constitutionality of Congress' creation (in the
Freedom of Information Act) of a right of action by any citizen to force
the disclosure of government documents. "If the Court is correct in this
case in holding that Richardson lacks standing under Art. III to litigate
his claim," Stewart wrote, "it would follow that a person whose request
under 5 U.S.C. § 552 has been denied would similarly lack standing
under Art. III despite the clear intent of Congress to confer a right of




Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization77 reinforces at
least a portion of the Stewart view-the knotty problem is "injury in
fact," the constitutional and non-prudential aspect of standing doctrine.
Respondents contested a revenue ruling that altered the Internal Revenue
Service's (IRS) interpretation of a "charitable" hospital. Prior IRS inter-
pretations had required that hospitals qualifying for charitable status pro-
vide free services to those unable to pay, limited only by the extent of the
enterprises' financial ability. The new ruling required that emergency-
room services alone be available to indigents without charge.78 Respond-
ents, all of whom or whose members had previously received free treat-
ment at qualifying hospitals, alleged that the relaxed requirements injured
them by restricting their ability to receive hospital services on a charitable
basis. They claimed that the new definition of "charitable" was not in
71. But c Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (finding standing to challenge congres-
sional review of members' qualifications).
72. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 173 (majority opinion) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
74. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974).
75. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 202 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 204-05.
77. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
78. Id. at 29-32.
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accordance with the congressional intent of section 501(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and had been issued in violation of the rulemaking
requirements of section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Court rejected the respondent's standing argument under the
"principle" of Linda R.S. The complaint, it held, alleged only that peti-
tioners had "encouraged" hospitals to deny services to indigents by adopt-
ing the revenue ruling. The implicit corollary of this allegation was that a
grant of respondents' requested relief, resulting in a requirement
that all hospitals serve indigents as a condition to favorable tax treat-
ment, would "discourage" hospitals from denying their services to
respondents. But it does not follow from the allegation and its corol-
lary that the denial of access to hospital services in fact results from
petitioners' new Ruling, or that a court-ordered return by petitioners
to their previous policy would result in these respondents' receiving
the hospital services they desire ....
It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's
remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability to re-
spondents of such services. So far as the complaint sheds light, it is
just as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents may apply
for service would elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid the
undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level of uncom-
pensated services."
SCRAP was distinguished in a footnote on pleading,80 and ADAPSO was
said to be consistent because there the Comptroller's action "legalized" the
harmful activities of competitors."
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring specially on "ripeness"
grounds, nevertheless agreed with the Simon respondents that the legaliza-
tion of activity harmful to them was precisely what was happening.82 One
has to wonder, therefore, why the Linda R.S. riposte had not been
thought fitting in ADAPSO. That selling computer services was illegal
without the Comptroller's new ruling certainly would not guarantee that
the banks would not do it! In frustration, Justices Brennan and Marshall
lamented, "We may properly wonder where the Court, armed with its
'fatally speculative pleadings' tool, will strike next."8
The Justices are still wondering. The only full-dress rehearsal of the
"nexus" issue since that time, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen-
79. Id. at 42-43.
80. Id. at 45 n.25.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 55-58 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
83. Id. at 63.
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tal Study Group, Inc.,"4 seems to stand for a preposterous proposition: If a
district court believes self-serving testimony in support of otherwise fatally
speculative pleadings, then the plaintiffs have standing and the court will
reach the merits, even if there is no federal jurisdiction in the first place.
Or perhaps Justices Brennan and Marshall came closer to the mark in
Simon, when they suggested that the Court's jurisprudence yields instead
the simple idea that standing to sue has become discretionary."5
C. Beneficiary Enforcement
The road from Rosado to the present is in fact three paths that have
not, and probably will not, fully converge. The first path leads from
Borak and involves actions "implied" from federal statutes. The second
proceeds from Rosado and involves section 1983 actions to enforce the
obligations of state governments, primarily with respect to federal-state
cooperative activities. The third traces damage actions derived directly
from the Constitution against federal officials and under section 1983
against state officials. Each path has its own byways and encroaching un-
derbrush. While traversing them we will try to keep the destination in
view.
1. The Path From Borak
The implied-cause-of-action jurisprudence speaks with the greatest
clarity. The "presumption" that persons benefiting from public regulatory
legislation can invoke ordinary judicial remedies when injured by others'
non-compliance has been reversed.
The reversal began in Cort v. Ash."' This case concerned a shareholder
derivative suit to recover corporate moneys expended in a presidential
election campaign in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibits corpo-
rations from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors . . . are
to be voted for." ' A unanimous Court set out a four-factor test for deter-
mining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. First, is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose spe-
cial benefit the statute was enacted-that is, does the statute create a fed-
eral right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legis-
lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
84. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
85. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 54-66 (1976) (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring).
86. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1976).
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one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy? And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law?"8
The opinion then proceeds to find that all of these considerations point
in the same direction. First, Congress was thought to have had only a
"secondary concern"89 with protecting shareholders. Its primary concern
was protecting the election process. Second, there was no specific congres-
sional intent to "vest in corporate shareholders a federal right to dam-
ages." 90 Third, in some astonishing language reminiscent of the standing
cases, the Court concluded that the damage remedy was not "necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose" because "such a remedy would
only permit directors in effect to 'borrow' corporate funds for a time; the
later compelled repayment might well not deter the initial violation and
would certainly not decrease the impact of the use of such funds upon an
election already past."91
Having come this far, the conclusion that state law should control was
certainly predictable. But again the language is arresting:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs
of the corporation. If, for example, state law permits corporations to
use corporate funds as contributions in state elections, shareholders
are on notice that their funds may be so used and have no recourse
under any federal statute. We are necessarily reluctant to imply a
federal right to recover funds used in violation of a federal statute
where the laws governing the corporation may put a shareholder on
notice that there may be no such recovery.9"
Since Cort, the Court has found an implied cause of action only in
quite special circumstances. In one case, for example, the statute stated
that transactions in violation of its provisions "shall be void,"93 thus sug-
gesting the private remedy of rescission. In another, the legislative history
was, for once, replete with statements that assumed the existence of pri-
vate actions.9 And, in a third, the Court viewed the Congress as acting in
the context of uniform acceptance of the existence of an implied right of
88. 422 U.S. at 78.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Id. at 82.
91. Id. at 84.
92. Id. at 84-85 (citation omitted).
93. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16-17 (1979).
94. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979).
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action.9 5
In recent cases, several members of the Court have striven to make clear
that the only real question is legislative intent, and Justice Powell has
opined that any "implication" of rights not specifically intended to be con-
ferred by the Congress would involve an unconstitutional aggrandizement
of judicial power.96 Indeed, so fixated on the statute has the Court become
that it has refused to recognize a right of contribution between joint
tortfeasors with respect to an express statutory cause of action because
such a right was not in the statute.9 7 And in Milwaukee v. Illinois,"8 in
1981, reversing its position in Illinois v. Milwaukee,9 decided in 1972,
the Court ruled that federal water pollution control statutes and the ad-
ministrative regime they envisage have wholly supplanted the federal com-
mon law in interstate pollution suits.
2. The Path from Rosado
Rosado-style enforcement of state obligations has met a more compli-
cated fate. Early restrictions on the state instrumentalities that might be
sued as "persons" pursuant to section 1983 have evaporated, 00 and state
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment has remained restricted to the
state's immediate officials. 101 Moreover, the Court passed by the invitation
to restrict section 1983 actions to enforce statutory rights to those based on
"civil rights" legislation 102 -a restriction found in the federal courts juris-
dictional statute, originally passed to facilitate the section 1983 cause of
action.103
Expansive interpretation of the remedial statute, section 1983, however,
has been accompanied by a cautious approach to the recognition of rights.
The Pennhurst case,'" for example, holds that sections of a federal grant
statute that were legislatively characterized as a "bill of rights" for the
developmentally disabled contain merely precatory language, not creating
any enforceable rights. Pennhurst may only signal increased solicitude for
fiscally strained state grantees when pursued by the putative beneficiaries
of joint federal-state spending programs that are meagerly funded at the
federal level. Alternatively, Pennhurst may be the beginning of a unifica-
95. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
96. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-44 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
98. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
99. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
100. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
101. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
102. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
104. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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tion of Rosado-style section 1983 actions with the implied right of action
cases and standing doctrine.
Indeed, the impetus to unify these divergent strains of "rights" juris-
prudence may prove irresistible. When the federal government regulates
X's private conduct for the benefit of Y, Y now has no implied action
against X absent evidence of legislative intent approximating an explicit
congressional conferral of a cause of action. And under contemporary
standing doctrine, the enforcement failures of the agency charged with
regulating X's behavior are also free from demands for judicial accounting
by Y unless the agency action requested would directly confer the benefit
Y seeks. In general, the relationship of agencies and their regulated par-
ties may not be controlled by assertion of beneficiary rights against either,
absent direct statutory conferral of such rights. Why should the situation
change when the regulated party happens to be a public entity?
The mere existence of section 1983 may not prove a sufficient answer to
that question. The National Sea Clammers105 case says so explicitly.
There, commercial fishing interests sought damages from various state
sewerage authorities that had despoiled their fishing grounds in violation
of federal water pollution statutes. The action was brought on an implied
right of action theory, but the Supreme Court recognized the potential
applicability of section 1983. Nevertheless, the action was rejected. In the
Court's opinion, the federal water pollution statutes, by establishing a
comprehensive scheme of regulation of private and public water pollution
(the latter predominately by means of sewerage treatment grant condi-
tions), had evinced a legislative intent to exclude private enforcement ac-
tions. Because the water pollution statutes post-date section 1983, the later
expression of intent, of course, prevails. A similar result was reached in
California v. Sierra Club06 without discussion of section 1983.
It is, of course, much too early to predict confidently where National
Sea Clammers and California v. Sierra Club might lead. But movement
toward precisely the primary administrative jurisdiction position rejected
in Rosado is hardly unthinkable. The occasional solicitude of the Court
for the "common law" in "implicit repeal" cases 07 does not necessarily
attach to section 1983. And such a position would be consistent with the
emerging principle that parties have that set, and only that explicit set, of
rights and remedies given them by statutes.
105. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
106. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
107. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
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3. The "Constitutional-Tort" Path
Only in the area of remedies for violations of constitutional rights have
events unfolded as might have been predicted around 1970. The Bivens"°8
action under the Fourth Amendment has been joined by actions under
other provisions, including importantly the due process clauses of the
Fifth10 9 and Fourteenth Amendments.110 Sovereign immunity remains a
barrier to recovery, but official immunity has been relaxed for actions
against both federal and state and local officials. 1 The quasi-tort princi-
ples surrounding these actions have been determined to be federal common
law,112 governable, perhaps, but not yet governed, by federal statute. That
common law is not consistently generous, and some see developments tak-
ing a restrictive turn."' Yet, administrative hearing rights aside, indepen-
dent judicial construction of constitutional rights and remedies seems rela-




The qualification in the last sentence is, of course, one key to what has
happened. A restrained judicial technique in an activist state will ratify
the statutory and administrative structures that the activist state generates.
If those structures are based on principles of collective need and centr
administration, then the restrained judicial conception of law will simi-
larly reflect those principles. One would expect such a development in a
unitary legal system. Where ideas of federal-state jurisdiction further re-
strict the development of federal common law and thereby deprecate judi-
cial creativity, 115 the result is a dramatic emphasis on legislative and ad-
ministrative activity as the generative force in the federal legal system.
The operative conception of law becomes, institutionally, the image of the
legislative-administrative state, and, substantively, the principle of the
pursuit of the general welfare. Individual rights and individual legal iden-
tity are then dependent upon either explicit recognition in a legislative-
administrative edict or upon derivation from a collective expression de-
fined by joint legislative-administrative activity.
108. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
109. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
110. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
111. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978).
112. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1978).
113. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980).
114. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
115. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, the cases that make up the volume 397 "pro-rights" collection
do not really deny this perspective. The prior discussion stresses aspects
of, and language in, the cases that are undeniably there, but gives only a
partial picture of the context and reasoning involved. In Goldberg, for
example, the recognition of the recipient's right to a pre-termination hear-
ing is premised in part on the program's need for accurate withdrawal
decisions: "The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of
welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to
receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that
end." '116 The recipient has a right because the government needs for him
to have one. Here lie the seeds, if not the sprouts, of the general welfare
calculation that will blossom in Mathews v. Eldridge.11 There, of course,
it is revealed-to extend the metaphor-as a parasitic flower. The coales-
cence of individual and social interests seems to devour the individual
rights ideals of Goldberg and metabolize them into a diaphanous tissue of
social cost accounting.
118
Borak and Rosado will support a similar analysis. Cort v. Ash is not
wholly disingenuous when it argues that the Borak Court relied on the
necessity of private enforcement to accomplish Congress' aims-a position
strongly supported in the litigation by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission."L9 In Rosado the Court opines:
That these formal doctrines of administrative law do not preclude
federal jurisdiction does not mean, however, that a federal court
must deprive itself of the benefit of the expertise of the federal
agency that is primarily concerned with these problems. Whenever
possible the district courts should obtain the views of HEW in those
cases where it has not set forth its views, either in a regulation or
published opinion, or in cases where there is real doubt as to how
the Department's standards apply to the particular state regulation
or program.
The District Court, in this instance, made considerable effort to
learn the views of HEW. The possibility of HEW's participation,
either as a party or an amicus, was explored in the District Court
and the Department determined to remain aloof. We cannot in these
circumstances fault the District Court for proceeding to try the
case.1
20
116. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
117. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
118. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1423 (1981); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28
(1976).
119. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 n.11 (1975).
120. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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And it is but a short step from saying that plaintiffs have a justiciable
right only where the agency welcomes private assistance, or is indifferent
to it, to saying that the agency should not have to police constantly the
boundaries of its enforcement jurisdiction by intervening in private
lawsuits.
Finally, ADAPSO has its own special limitations." 1 For while the
ADAPSO holding permits pleadings to survive a motion to dismiss where
the interest asserted is "arguably within the zone of interests protected or
regulated," it reserves for the merits the question whether the plaintiff has
in fact been given an enforceable right. The plaintiff may demonstrate
injury in fact and official illegality, yet lose because no special duty to
behave legally was owed to him. Whether it was owed is, of course, a
question of whether the legislature intended to confer the right. Upon
moving from the pleading to the summary judgment stage, the pre-
ADAPSO standing idea of "legal wrong," statutorily based, re-emerges as
clearly as does the limiting effect of "injury in fact" in the jurisprudence
from Linda R.S. to Simon.
The "individual rights" cases are thus themselves Janus-faced. They
assert individual rights without abandoning the need to locate those rights
in state purposes. They are the hybrid creations of an activist court at-
tempting to bridge the gap between two quite distinct conceptions of the
legal order. But hybrids are not necessarily fecund. Indeed, save in excep-
tional circumstances, we should expect that they would either disappear or
be an insignificant addition to an environment dominated by the species
which spawned them. This, I want to argue, has been the fate of the
volume 397 cases. But to do so I must first identify more clearly what the
dominant species are and what characteristics the volume 397 hybrids in-
herited from each. We can then see developments after 1970 as a rela-
tively coherent extension of the parents' traits, while leaving the hybrids a
specific niche defined by the interaction of their special genetic endow-
ments with the general politico-legal environment.
V. The Models of Statist and Individualist Legal Rights Refined
The rights to participation, accounting, and third-party-beneficiary en-
forcement have not been very well specified. What, in fact, do I mean
when I say that someone has one of these rights? The answer is straight-
forward and traditional: I mean that they have a cause of action, a claim
recognizable and enforceable in a court. The question in all of the cases
and contexts previously discussed is whether certain rights, of particular
121. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (concurrence
for both Barlow and ADAPSO).
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importance in an administrative state, will be found to exist.
I want to suggest in this section that this "finding" of rights goes on
within a legal culture that has certain rules of recognition, that is, certain
ways of seeing claims as justiciable and as, therefore, within the domain of
judicially enforceable rights. Indeed, I want to argue that there are two
quite distinct ways of "seeing"' 2 rights and that only those that can be
seen in a particular way will be thought justiciable. These ways of seeing
are, thus, also ways of allocating power among legal institutions. The cre-
ation, elaboration, and enforcement of rights that can be seen in the "indi-
vidualist" conception are allocated to courts; those that are observable only
from the "statist" perspective are allocated to legislative and administra-
tive institutions with courts playing only an instrumental enforcement role
in realizing legislative and administrative purposes.
How then shall we describe these ways of seeing that make up the
American legal culture? Consider a stylized formulation of a legal right:
"A owes a duty to B to do (or to refrain from) X because of Y." If we can
provide a sketch of how these As and Bs and Xs and Ys are to be elabo-
rated in the respective individualist and statist formulations, then we are
on the way toward a description of the legal culture and how it typically
allocates power over rights. We can then move somewhat beyond the ele-
ments of rights (A, B, X, and Y) to develop some additional characteris-
tics of statist and individualist legal thinking that touch on questions of
the sources of legal authority and the orientation of each perceptual model
to the general social and political order.'12 Derivation of these elements
and characteristics and their association into more detailed models of indi-
vidualist and statist legal rights is the business of the next two sections.
A. The Elements of Rights
Consider first the characteristics of A and B, the subjects and objects of
rights in the formal rights statement. In the individualist model (which I
shall refer to as "IM") both are individuals or collectivities to whom an
individual legal personality has been given, like Joe Smith, Sally Brown,
Local 125 of the Pipefitters and Boilermakers Union, IBM, the govern-
ment of Argentina. The statist model (which I shall refer to as "SM"), on
the other hand, imagines A and B (or at least one of them) as
groups-labor, blacks, women, society, environmentalists, manufacturers,
the poor, the rich-that may or may not have a private legal personality.
The SM has no difficulty seeing "interest groups"; the IM can see them
122. This metaphor is that of J. VINING, supra note 24, at 16.
123. See Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE LJ.
480 (1975); M. DAMASKA, LAW, AUTHORITY AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS (forthcoming).
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only if they take a certain limited number of legal forms.
Second the "duty" relationship between A and B is general or recipro-
cal in the IM. The subjects and objects of rights can be switched with no
loss of meaning. The content of the duty is an action or re-
straint-delivery, payment, caution, or the like-that is available to all the
legal actors represented by the A and B placeholders. The IM may some-
times speak of general categories-creditors' rights or debtors' obligations,
for example-but these legal characterizations are transaction-specific;
they flow from the contingency of holding a particular position within the
structure of some particular claim of legal right. The same is not true of
the SM sphere. There identities are fixed by facts unrelated to particular
legal claims and entail non-reciprocal rights and duties. Labor, for exam-
ple, does not owe management a safe place to work or a duty not to inter-
fere in efforts to organize collectively. Blacks do not owe whites the same
duty of non-discrimination that whites owe blacks. To switch the parties
in SM talk is to change the duty owed.
This distinction between the general or special content of X, the duty
owed, begins to tell us something about Y, the reason that lies behind the
right. Since the parties cannot be switched in the statist model, the rights
and the condition of being the subject or object of rights are attached in
some way to status. A's owing B arises out of who A and B are. In the
IM picture, the duty arises out of communications or physical interactions
with respect to which the group status of the actors is irrelevant. Rights
flow from events, not descriptions of legal personality. Particular actions
are the attributes of parties that are relevant to an IM allocation of bene-
fits and burdens; general status plays that role from the SM perspective.
But these two observations about X and Y, the content of rights and
reasons for their existence, only begin to tell us how claims are articu-
lated. We need a further elaboration of the linkages1 24 between A and B
to make rights perceptible within the individualist and statist models. In
particular, we need to know when actions and statuses are relevant and
how that conception of relevance is justified. What are the occasions for
rights-enforcement and what principles make those occasions morally
justifiable?
In the IM world, action becomes relevant when there is loss-A hits B
or takes her car without paying the price. Examples of loss involving ad-
ministrative behavior include A revoking B's license or invading his pri-
vacy by searching his premises. SM spectacles, by contrast, have greater
peripheral and probabilistic vision. They see risks rather than losses.
124. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975) (developing variations on idea of "causation" as essential linkage).
1154
Vol. 92: 1129, 1983
HeinOnline -- 92 Yale L.J. 1154 1982-1983
Rights in the Administrative State
Claims may be cognizable on the ground that A creates conditions that
increase the risk that B will be hit, will fail to get what it imagined it was
getting from its bargain, or will be systematically disadvantaged in a mar-
ket economy. Examples of SM claims involving the kinds of rights we
have been discussing would include A failing to keep Z within the terms
of its discharge permit, thereby increasing B's health risks; A conscripting
B into the army, thereby impairing B's future earning prospects and in-
creasing B's risk of disability; and A freely enforcing contracts in private
markets, thereby creating the risk that B's particular human capital will
be given a low value.
Neither all losses nor all risks, however, occasion rights creation or en-
forcement. In each model, there must be a moral rationale for recognizing
or selecting particular loss or risk linkages as legally relevant. The inter-
nal moral principle that informs the IM universe is corrective justice.
125
When A harms B by upsetting his expectations that his personal property
will be secure against invasion, he must repair the damage, provided he
caused the damage by some action or inaction that was (under the circum-
stances) unreasonable or he profited unjustly by A's loss. The IM struc-
ture of moral justification can be captured in a few general legal princi-
ples concerning reasonable expectations, prudent conduct, and unjust
enrichment.
Different moral principles inform rights in the statist conception. In
general terms, they are the pursuit of the general welfare and the mainte-
nance of a minimally just overall distribution of resources. From this per-
spective, A may be required to act so that B's risks of loss are reduced
provided some plausible story can be told about general welfare being en-
hanced thereby. And A might be required to pay taxes to support B on
the basis of either general welfare or just distribution arguments. Indeed,
general welfare and just distribution stories may be as various as the in-
terests and distributional values that any group within the society might
be said to hold. General welfare and just distribution "principles" thus
inhabit a kaleidoscope of governmental policies and programs, each with
its own complex rationale.
B. Some Additional Characteristics
We have so far two clusters of characteristics that describe the basic
elements of rights formulations in the individualist and statist models.
Those characteristics are defined by distinct conceptions of legal personal-
125. See Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982); Cole-
man, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pts. I & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982), 2
LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983).
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ity (individual-group), of the scope of duties (general-specific), of the occa-
sions for legal intervention (loss-risk), of the attributes relevant to allocat-
ing benefits and burdens (acts-statuses), and of the moral underpinnings
for legal claims (corrective justice-general welfare or distributional fair-
ness). These characteristics of IM and SM rights together suggest a fur-
ther series of conceptions concerning rights-creation, the authoritative
sources of law, the structure of legal authority, and, ultimately, the nature
of social processes and the role of the state. These ideas again may be
briefly sketched.
The source of IM ideas about reasonable conduct, just expectations,
and the like, which constitute the operative notion of corrective justice, is
the specific culture within which the events giving rise to claims of right
occur. Rights are recognized as emerging from the traditions and practices
that give pattern and meaning to the culture itself. Law thus has its
source in practice. SM conceptions of policy based on distributional fair-
ness or the general welfare arise, by contrast, from self-conscious and pur-
posive collective action. Law is constructed through rational assessment of
ends and means or through some authoritative process of preference
aggregation.
12 6
The institutions through which law is created and applied are thus
quite different in the two models. Judgments resolving individualized dis-
putes arising out of specific contexts and concerning the requirements of
traditional notions of corrective justice require adjudicatory mechanisms
anchored in the communities of the disputants. The construction and op-
eration of legal regimes designed to increase distributional fairness or the
general welfare by adjusting the relationship of groups require both a
general social perspective and a managerial competence. IM presumes the
processes of tribunals; SM the operations of legislative and administrative
organs.127
The structure of legal authority in an individualist regime is character-
ized by coordinate power and by lay officials. The tribunal as cultural
arbiter has a localized expertise through its attachment to the community.
Centralized state direction or norm creation would be dysfunctional. Ju-
risdiction is therefore territorial and coordinate. But the expertise referred
to does not result from professional training or specialized experience. It is
rather the expertise of the cultural insider, an expertise easily available to
lay judges and juries. Given the random and episodic nature of the occa-
126. Cf. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (describing two ap-
proaches to lawmaking-"ordinary observing" and "scientific policymaking"-in quite similar terms).
127. Chayes and Fiss have made particularly noteworthy efforts to reinterpret the paradigm in
the American public law context. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Jus-
tice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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sions for the exercise of legal authority, dispute resolution might even be
carried on by wholly ad hoc tribunals.
By contrast, the statist model sees the exercise of legal authority as the
implementation of a complex plan. Moreover, given that legal means may
have a non-obvious causal relationship to social goals, there is a need for
technical expertise in the design of policies and for centralized direction
and continuous supervision in carrying them out. The structure of legal
authority in SM regimes, therefore, tends to be both centralized and
professional.
These structures of authority seem further to involve certain presup-
positions about social processes and the role of the state. The individualist
model presumes a social order that is autonomous and relatively stable.
The law derives its norms from the culture and applies authority (or vin-
dicates rights) in order to reestablish the social equilibrium that has been
disturbed. Moreover, this intervention to reconstruct the status quo ante
exhausts the state's role in shaping the social world. The statist vision, by
contrast, is of a social process both dynamic and malleable. Rational col-
lective action defines social goals and embodies them in law. Legal author-
ity is then wielded to shape the social future in accordance with those
goals. The state thus has a potentially inexhaustible role in the ongoing
process of social realization.
Table 1 collects these pairs of conceptions into a set of selective charac-
teristics of the individualist and statist models of law. I do not want to
argue that these models remain pure in practice or that there is any logi-
cal necessity for the arrangement. Individual legal personality and a per-
ception of risk, for example, can be combined as can state activism and
coordinate authority. 12 8 My point is only that these characteristics tend to
be associated in these ways in the American legal system and that we can
trace analytic linkages within the two models that, while falling short of
logical entailment, suggest a certain harmonious interconnection of the
characteristics.
The advantage of viewing the recognition of rights in terms of these
polar models is that they emphasize the conceptually problematic position
of rights in the American administrative state. We are here dealing with
rights asserted in litigation, an IM form, but relating to SM structures.
This juxtaposition creates a struggle between the two models for primacy
with respect to the conception of rights that will be employed, a struggle
that may range across at least the characteristics of rights that we have
sketched and that may be resolved in any number of ways. Note, however,
that to the extent that the statist model becomes the dominant image of
128. See Damaska, supra note 123.
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federal administrative law, it will pose grave problems for judicial adjudi-
cation. Numerous characteristics of the individualist model are incorpo-
rated in conventional notions of justiciability. To maintain a significant
judicial role in this public legal order, the courts will either have to trans-
form themselves'into institutions more closely resembling legislatures and
administrative agencies or they will have to "individualize" public law
assertions of interests and responsibilities by translating them into justicia-




Dimensions Paradigm Individualist Statist
of Rights (Private Law) (Public Law)
Recognizable groups, often with
Claimants/Debtors (A&B) neutral placeholders distinctive interests
(or general public)
Characteristic Duty (x) generall special/
Formulations reciprocal unilateral
Standard Occasions damage risk
for Legal Intervention
Attributes Relevant to (y) actions statuses
Allocating Benefits/Burdens
general welfare
Principle of Justice corrective distributional equity
Additional Characteristics
Sources of Rights evolving custom means-ends rationality
(collective choice)
Orientation to derivative directive
Social Order
Characteristic decentralized, lay centralized, expert
Authority Structure tribunal administrative agency
Table 1
VI. Mediating the Claims of the Individualist and Statist Models: From
Laissez Faire Through the Legitimation of the New Deal
But these are in some sense polar strategies for coping with the recogni-
tion that a new public legal order, call it the administrative state, has
129. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Chayes, supra note 127; Fiss,
supra note 127.
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arisen. For most of the period in which we could be said to have had a
federal administrative law, the courts have instead been content to func-
tion, in somewhat different capacities, on both sides of an uneasy border
between the individualist and statist conceptions of public law. Indeed, a
brief sketch of how the federal legal order evolved into semi-autonomous
branches and how doctrines concerning standing, hearing rights, and im-
plied actions shifted to accommodate that evolution will set the stage for
reconsidering the intellectual significance of the volume 397 cases.
A. The General Legal Culture
If we took the beginning of the twentieth century as a somewhat arbi-
trary starting point, the American legal universe would obviously look
quite different than it does today. Law would appear to be primarily pri-
vate law, the common law of tort, property, and contract. Public law
would consist principally of crimes and taxes. a30 Although experiments
with social and economic legislation were increasing," 1 the common law
was sufficiently unified that the federal courts could develop and apply
it1" 2 without noticing the impairment of state power that was to provoke
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.1"' Much of the earlier and distinctive state regu-
latory legislation-the raw materials for multiple statist legal sys-
tems-had been swept away by a combination of Jacksonian populism
and free enterprise capitalism.13 4 The central image of law was thus the
common law, judicially made in suits between private parties concerning
their rights. This was positive law that emerged from the bottom up in a
decentralized process of dispute resolution. A rough approximation of the
IM conception of rights prevailed.
This is the legal world of International News Service v. Associated
Press,1 35 a world in which the majority of the Court felt it could isolate
and adjudicate private rights to "the news" without considering the public
interest in its dissemination. The defendant INS's principal argument,
that it, as a part of the public, could use stories that AP had placed in the
public domain, was indeed described by the Court as the "fault in [its]
reasoning." 3 ' Equity was concerned instead with corrective justice and, as
between AP and INS, the Court could easily recognize a limited property
right in order to prevent unjust enrichment. In the Court's words, "[A]
130. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 494-524, 567-95 (1973).
131. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 395-97, 406-11
(1950).
132. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
134. See L. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 457-58 (1954).
135. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
136. Id. at 239.
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competitor who is misappropriating [news] for the purpose of disposing of
it to his own profit and to the disadvantage of complainant cannot be
heard to say that it is too fugitive or evanescent to be regarded as prop-
erty.' 137 The Court, therefore, let stand an injunction against INS use of
AP news "until its commercial value as news to the complainant had
passed away."138 The individualist paradigm-discrete events, concrete
loss, placeholder parties and the morality of rectification-shapes the
analysis.
Yet a new day was already dawning. For Justice Brandeis in dissent,
the simple injustice identified by the Court was clear enough. But Bran-
deis could not forget that the world had become complex:
The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth . . .by invoking
analogies or by expanding a rule or principle. This process has been
in the main wisely applied and should not be discontinued. Where
the problem is relatively simple, as it is apt to be when private inter-
ests only are involved, it generally proves adequate. But with the
increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends to become
omnipresent; and the problems presented by new demands for justice
cease to be simple. Then the creation or recognition by courts of a
new private right may work serious injury to the general public, un-
less the boundaries of the right are definitely established and wisely
guarded. In order to reconcile the new private right with the public
interest, it may be necessary to prescribe limitations and rules for its
enjoyment; and also to provide administrative machinery for enforc-
ing the rules. It is largely for this reason that, in the effort to meet
the many new demands for justice incident to a rapidly changing
civilization, resort to legislation has latterly been had with increasing
frequency. 39
Indeed, as Brandeis proceeds he begins to sketch the statist model. He is
concerned both about the social and political conditions that influence the
access that different organizations have to news sources and about the pos-
sible need to impose a responsibility for public dissemination should a
property right in "collected" news be recognized. He was further con-
cerned that remedies be tailored to protect the public interest and he
doubted that judicial relief of any sort could be as efficacious as continu-
ous monitoring and adjustment by "administrative machinery." From
Brandeis' perspective, assigning private rights to particular interests might
well help protect the public interest, but then again it might not. The
general question was not inter-party corrective justice. It was instead how
137. Id. at 240.
138. Id. at 245-46.
139. Id. at 262-63 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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to devise a comprehensive scheme that would promote the general welfare
by adjusting the various interests affected.
It is, of course, just this view of the world that emerges triumphant
from the politics of the 1920's and 1930's. But the legal acceptance of the
statist model was neither easy nor complete. The story of the Old Court
and the New Deal is too oft-told a tale to rehearse here-even in a confer-
ence with the title of this one. But we might tarry just long enough to put
a central feature of that struggle-the labor contract-into our present
vernacular. For a time, the Court simply could not conceive of workers
and management, of a legislatively shaped employment status, and of
rights flowing out of conditions. It saw instead individuals making con-
tracts whose terms were subject to their wills. Yet, in the end, the statu-
tory barrage from progressive state legislatures and New Deal Congresses
re-educated the judiciary. The Court ultimately recognized not only the
legitimacy of legislative tinkering, but also the conceptual revolution that
administrative law entailed.
The leading cases of the immediate post-New Deal period reflect this
understanding. In the famous Hearst case, 140 for example, the Hearst
Newspapers attempted to avoid application of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) to their "newsboys" by arguing that they were not
employees but independent contractors. The company claimed, moreover,
that there was no evidence upon which the National Labor Relations
Board could find employee status. The Supreme Court first rejected the
notion that the word "employee" in the NLRA retained its common law
meaning. It then went on to describe the role of the Court and the Board
in developing the meaning of "employee":
It is not necessary to this case to make a completely definitive limi-
tation around the term "employee." That task has been assigned pri-
marily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. De-
termination of "where all the conditions of the relation require
protection" involves inquiries for the Board charged with this duty.
Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives it fa-
miliarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment re-
lationships in various industries, with the abilities and needs of the
workers for self-organization and collective action, and with the
adaptability of collective bargaining for the peaceful settlement of
their disputes with their employers. The experience thus acquired
must be brought frequently to bear on the question who is an em-
ployee under the Act. Resolving that question, like determining
140. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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whether unfair labor practices have been committed, "belongs to the
usual administrative routine" of the Board.1"
B. The Rights in Question
Comparing the standing, right to hearing, and implied action jurispru-
dence of the first three decades of this century to that of the late 1930's
and 1940's reveals a similar development. At first, the individualist model
shapes the legal imagination. Then the statist model gains recognition and
is alm6st simultaneously viewed as autonomous, as separate both concep-
tually and institutionally from the individualist conception of rights. Two
parallel systems then exist with the Court as their institutional nexus.
The problem for the Court, ultimately, is to mediate the claims of the two
systems for the same judicial territory. And heie the development of the
doctrines that have held our attention may diverge.
1. Standing
The standing cases illustrate these general propositions fairly happily.
Around 1920, the Court clearly recognized only an IM form of standing.
A party could sue a government official only if directly harmed by wrong-
ful official action. The "wrong" might be established either by the private
common law or by the specific terms of a statute. The action was essen-
tially a private lawsuit in which the official would plead her authority to
act as a defense. 42 To have standing was to have what was conventionally
understood as a private cause of action.
By at least 1940, a statist version of standing had emerged. A party had
standing if the Congress had conferred it in the public interest, that is,
had made persons of the plaintiffs' class "private attorneys general" to
police the actions of federal officials.143 These new standing rights
emerged pursuant to legislative prescriptions specially providing judicial
review to any person "adversely affected or aggrieved. 1 44 The federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946,145 which "restated" more
than it reshaped the law, ratified both the individualist and the statist
conceptual bases for recognizing party standing to seek judicial review of
agency action.
141. Id. at 130.
142. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v.
United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S.
143 (1923).
143. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Associated Indus. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
144. E.g., Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1976).
145. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 241 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576,
701-706 (1982)).
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2. The Right to a Hearing
The right-to-a-hearing story is rather more complicated, but again two
types of rights emerge. One is the common law image of a judicial trial. It
has been elaborated as a requirement of constitutional due process, but
draws on common law sources of procedural fairness that antedate both
our due process clauses. The other is a right, often informed by the IM
ideal, but dependent upon specific legislation for its existence and, after
1946, either upon a specific statute or the APA for its content.
The complication in the story is, of course, that the Court always recog-
nized that a judicial or "quasi-judicial" trial was not the only constitu-
tional means of exercising governmental power. Yet, by 1920, the leading
cases affirmed that a complaining party was entitled to present both oral
argument and testimonial proofs before having any individual right
(meaning "liberty" or "property" as conventionally understood) deter-
mined.""' Such a requirement is both profoundly anti-bureaucratic and, in
the right hands, wonderfully obstructionist. This latter point was hardly
lost on the opponents of state social legislation. Indeed, procedural due
process was employed 14 7 to invalidate state regulation a decade prior to
Lochner's famous substantive version.148 The IM paradigm, as a norma-
tive constitutional conception, included the notion that private property
claims had to be considered by the methods of private law process.
Yet as early as 1915, the Court had also admitted that administrators
could employ legislative-style processes to deal with issues of general,
rather than individual, interest.14 9 As many statutes addressing general
questions of public or group interest impressed the statist model of rights
on the legal imagination, more and more administrative functions under
those statutes came to be viewed as essentially "legislative." The processes
to be used in these new SM arenas were then creatures of the statutory
regimes themselves. The question of whether and what kind of hearings
were required became a question to be addressed by purposive statutory
construction rather than by reflecting on the customary procedures of the
private law.150
There was still, of course, the awkward problem of deciding whether
the plaintiff was asserting a common law right subject to protection
through judicial process or a legislative interest capable of adjustment by
whatever process promoted the general welfare. And the awkward
146. See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
147. See Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
148. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
149. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
150. For an excellent example of this trend, see Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183 (1979).
1163
HeinOnline -- 92 Yale L.J. 1163 1982-1983
The Yale Law Journal
formula devised to make these awkward decisions was little more than a
conclusory assignment of traditional property and liberty interests to a
private law category called "rights," while statutorily based, non-tradi-
tional interests were assigned to a category called "privileges." '151 Thus
were IM and SM hearing rights separated and their development ren-
dered autonomous within their own assigned spheres.
3. Implied Actions
To sketch the doctrinal story of implied causes of action up to the pas-
sage of the APA we need note only three cases. The first is Texas &
Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 1 2 which in 1916 recognized a right of action under
the Federal Safety Appliance Act. But the basis of recognition was that
the action fit within the individualist model. The Court's rationale was
the already conventional notion of negligence per se:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from
the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the com-
mon law expressed . . . in these words: "So, in every case, where a
statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he
shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for
his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him con-
trary to the said law." This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi
jus ibi remedium. [Where there is a right, there is a remedy.]
153
Then came Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,"" which virtually eliminated the
federal courts' role in the development of private law. Henceforth, if fed-
eral regulation were to provide the basis for a tort suit in federal court,
the action would have to be reconceived as an action implementing the
federal statute and, therefore, "arising under" federal law. The individu-
alist-statist dichotomy was thus reinforced by notions of federalism imbed-
ded in federal court jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in the new statist conception, statutory policy, not correc-
tive justice, determined the recognition of rights. As the Court stated in
the third case, Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 15 in 1942:
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and
151. See Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Adminis-
trative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 445-52 (1977).
152. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
153. Id. at 39-40 (citations omitted).
154. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
155. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
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nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by
the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal ques-
tions, the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the
federal policy which it has adopted.1"6
The Court left further development of private law ideas of corrective jus-
tice by reference to federal statutory standards to the state courts.
C. The New Deal and the Dual Legal Order
The separation of individualist and statist areas of federal law, which is
distinct in these doctrinal developments, tended to support and protect
public authority from judicial meddling at the behest of individual claim-
ants. It placed substantive policy, procedural requirements, and enforce-
ment discretion firmly within congressional-administrative control. This
dual legal system is the conceptual legacy of New Deal politics, which
saw all too clearly the collapse of confidence in a private market struc-
tured and supported by an individualist conception of law.15 New Deal
statutes provided new political institutions within which organized inter-
ests could support production and bargain about the distribution of the
gains from productivity, as well as new programs of income support that
would help maintain aggregate demand.1 58 The hegemony of IM thinking
was overcome by restricting it to a private sphere that would not threaten
these new institutions and programs.
VII. The Political Imperatives of the Sixties
Thirty years later the political agenda had changed radically. Low pro-
ductivity and anemic demand were no longer the problems that garnered
political attention. The great domestic issues instead were limiting the
damaging side effects of abundance, while producing a fairer distribution
of the colossal wealth generated by post-war economic recovery.1 59 The
need was not for institutions within which existing social groups could
plan and bargain or which could implement programs of income security,
but rather for institutions that would protect interests that had no
groups.
160
Moreover, the success of the courts in empowering largely unorganized
blacks by creating justiciable civil rights suggested that judicial recognition
156. Id. at 176.
157. See T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
158. For general discussions of these issues, see C. BEARD & H. SMITH, THE FUTURE COMES: A
STUDY OF THE NEW DEAL (1933); NEW DEAL THOUGHT (H. Zinn ed. 1966).
159. See, e.g., R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POV
ERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).
160. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-56 (1976).
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of rights might play a creative rather than a stifling role in the emerging
program of reform. Whereas courts had been the enemy of the New Deal,
they were the allies of the Great Society. The "expert" and "flexible"
agencies of the 1940's legal imagination, on the other hand, were now
stodgy bureaus "captured" by special interests....
The volume 397 cases are, of course, a part of this political reform
movement. If agencies give in to special interests, let those whose opportu-
nities are reduced or whose risks are increased have a right to judicial
review. If agencies are error prone, give those outsiders who have the facts
a right to a hearing. If agency enforcement is lax, let those affected by
wrongful conduct have a right to seek enforcement themselves. The con-
ceptual problem was how to get from the separation of individualist and
statist rights that had preserved the relative autonomy of administrative
action from judicial intrusion to some new vision of rights that would
utilize individual claims, judicial review, and private enforcement as com-
ponents of a functional public law system.
Yet, as we have seen, the "rights" that were generated by judicial at-
tempts at reconceptualization have turned out to be both limited in scope
and fragile in use. The reason, I want to argue, is that the individualist
and statist models have a certain general coherence. The various dimen-
sions or aspects of each model fit together in a culturally understandable
pattern. Reinterpreting one in terms of the other or borrowing techniques
from one for the other will tend, therefore, to create special legal concep-
tions that have little analogical force. As courts address new questions,
they will be driven, by their usual attempts to analyze the novel in terms
of the familiar, to think in terms of the general models rather than of the
hybrid forms. Creating a large number of hybrids having similar charac-
teristics may, of course, yield a new general model, but that has not yet
occurred.
Consider, therefore, the volume 397 cases as hybrids. What genes did
they take from their individualist and statist parents? Goldberg first re-
tains the individualist idea of property. To be sure, that idea is somewhat
reinterpreted and cut loose from the peculiar notion that government
grants could not provide a basis for property interests-an idea that
hardly comports with the history of American land law or, indeed, with
the feudal tenure system from which it has been derived. Property rights,
as Goldberg conceives them, are claims to things having economic value,
claims which are ubiquitous in traditional IM discourse. From SM it
takes the idea that effectively implementing the property regime by proper
161. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AND THE ICC (1970); T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND
THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975).
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assignment of rights is pursuing a public interest. The opinion then melds
these ideas into the requirement of an accuracy-seeking decision process
that borrows heavily from the evidentiary techniques of judicial trial.
It follows from this description that Goldberg's hybrid right to a hear-
ing will have little attraction where either element is missing, that is,
where individually appropriable property is not at issue or where the
function involved cannot be described as policy implementation through
accurate fact-finding."6 2 In short, Goldberg contains no new general idea
of participation by affected interests in administrative processes. It creates
no general and justiciable right that can be played out across the myriad
varieties of administrative functions and private interests.
The Supreme Couirt has thus (its grotesquely incompetent explanations
aside) been quite consistent with Goldberg in rejecting attempts to turn
government activities having a decidedly IM character, like employment
contracts 163 and official torts,' 6 into government programs of policy im-
plementation. And it has equally consistently resisted attempts to make
general policy implementation into activities that implicate separably ap-
propriable private property.'6 5 Moreover, it has taken seriously the notion
that the new property, like the old, has determinable attributes. Claims
relating to some aspect of a public program bearing on, but not directly
deciding, the allocation of a statutorily defined property interest are not
appropriate occasions for Goldberg-style hearings.' 66 The Court has taken
the public interest equally seriously. Hearings are not to be conferred as a
right unless they would have a significant probability of enhancing accu-
rate policy implementation. 6 7
The components of the ADAPSO standing hybrid are fairly obvious.
Injury in fact retains IM's realized-harm perspective. And it is this aspect
of the ADAPSO test that has proven most limiting in subsequent applica-
tion. The "arguably within the class of persons protected or regulated"
formula takes an essentially statist perspective on the right-duty linkage.
It abandons both the IM-oriented "especial benefit" formulation, com-
monly required for private law to recognize statutorily based rights of ac-
tion, and the necessity that official actions run directly to or against a
party to produce the requisite legal interest. The requirement is merely
162. Cf O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (determining suitability
of Medicare provider without giving hearing to its residents); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78 (1978) (determining adequacy of medical student's clinical progress without hearing).
163. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
164. See, e.g., Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
165. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
166. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
167. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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that the plaintiff be within the general framework of interests and respon-
sibilities established by the statute-that he be recognized by the statutory
scheme as at risk or as creating risks. ADAPSO thus generalizes the pre-
APA "adversely affected or aggrieved" idea to include legislative programs
not employing that formulation in a specific judicial review provision.
The standing hybrid, unlike Goldberg's right to a hearing, is less easily
rationalized as having been consistently applied in subsequent cases. Or
perhaps, stretching the metaphor, one should view the ADAPSO formula-
tion as having an unstable genetic composition. On the one hand, there
occasionally has seemed to be a distinct possibility of metamorphosis into a
purely statist conception. The SCRAP and Duke Power cases, for exam-
ple, suggest that increased risk will satisfy the requirement of injury in
fact, at least where the statutory scheme that gives rise to the complaint is
itself essentially concerned with restructuring risks. In such a scenario, the
probabilistic future effect of positive and negative incentives on the con-
crete situations of identifiable litigants would not inhibit judicial remedial
action because remedies would be seen as oriented toward a class or
group, rather than toward an individual. Indeed, recent developments in
product liability law, like Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,"", suggest that
the historical incarnation of IM thinking-the private law of tort-may
be shifting its conception of the right-duty paradigm."" And how long
will IM be able to hold the legal imagination when its own foundations
are unsettled?
Yet one should not get carried away when envisioning this developmen-
tal scenario. The plaintiffs in Sindell were not merely at risk; their can-
cers had appeared and were provably related to administration of the
product. The only open question was whose product. Sindell may thus do
for a corner of products liability law only what ADAPSO did for stand-
ing-broaden individual right-duty linkages to encompass group interest-
responsibility relationships. It is, therefore, hardly a paradigm-shifting
case that will pull injury-in-fact analysis into a new intellectual orbit.
168. 85 Cal. App. 3d 391, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978), vacated, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
169. The shifting nature of the right-duty paradigm in product liability cases is best illustrated in
the developing theories of alternative and enterprise liability. See id. While still requiring plaintiffs to
establish an injury in fact and defendant's negligence, Sindell and its progeny have radically altered
the nature of causation in product liability suits. These cases have dispensed with the concrete linkage
between victim and wrongdoer, a principal characteristic of IM thinking. Indeed, plaintiffs may re-
cover without ever alleging-much less proving-that defendant's negligence inflicted any demonstra-
ble harm.
The most compelling, and most often invoked, justification for this departure from traditional tort
notions of causation is the need for cost-spreading. As Justice Brennan has noted in a different con-
text, "No longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of liability; the principle of equitable
loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of [public] misconduct." Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's insistence in the standing cases that in-
jury in fact, the traditional IM touchstone, is the constitutional bedrock
for Article III standing hardly suggests a disposition to radically reorient
standing doctrine without statutory authorization. Insistence on injury in
fact may, to the contrary, suggest limitations on Congress' ability to fur-
ther develop the statist model-at least in Article III courts.
There is also reason to believe that the post-ADAPSO prudential as-
pect of standing remains locked within the bifurcated structure ("suffering
legal wrong"=IM; "adversely affected or aggrieved"=SM) ratified by
the APA's standing provisions. For ADAPSO itself, when articulating the
new standing test, distinguished between the pleading stage and the mer-
its. And if on the merits plaintiffs must prove either that Congress meant
to confer upon them an "especial benefit" or that they have been directly
regulated, then nothing much has changed. The real standing question
has merely been shifted from the pleading to the summary judgment stage
of the litigation. Thus viewed, ADAPSO standing becomes an ephemeral
as well as a hybrid legal doctrine. It may repeatedly sprout, bloom, and
wither within the context of particular cases without changing the reme-
dial gene pool specialized to pure IM and pure SM forms.
The bonding of public and private law notions in Rosado and Borak is
rather more complicated. Although neither case makes much of the ques-
tion, because on the facts it was easily answered affirmatively, both accept
the traditional "especial benefit" formula for identifying whether a statu-
tory rule of conduct can be made the basis for a private claim of right.
Thus, the SM dimensions of the cases seem to predominate. The Borak
court justifies its conferring the right, not on corrective justice grounds,
but primarily because of the private action's potential contribution to ef-
fective enforcement of public policy. Indeed, it virtually has to do so. The
conduct complained of could not be undone without significantly harming
other innocent parties. And any damages awarded would surely have had
little provable relationship to what the plaintiffs' position would have
been absent the use of "misleading" proxy solicitations.
The Rosado opinion, as we noted previously,17 instructs district courts
hearing similar claims to invite the participation of the responsible federal
grant agency and, presumably, to defer to its expertise. Moreover, the
Rosado court seems perfectly at ease with a remedial request that bears
only an indirect and highly problematic relationship to any concrete
change in the plaintiffs' circumstances. The Court explicitly notes that
requiring revision of the AFDC standard of need only puts some marginal
170. See supra pp. 1134-36.
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political pressure on the state legislature to revise grant levels. 17 '1 But the
opinion goes on to say that this restructuring of political incentives seems
to be exactly what Congress had in mind when it adopted the standard of
need requirement.1 72  The Court will enforce the congressional will
whether or not it produces any concrete change in benefits levels because
changing the chances of concrete changes is the purpose of the statute.
Enforcing statutes that shift risks, not corrective justice, is the core of the
judicial role in the statist model.
Post-Rosado doctrinal developments concerning implied causes of action
may thus be seen as playing out the SM and IM paradigms in different
strands of jurisprudence. The Borak-type cases have simply reinterpreted
"especial benefit" to unite it with the public interest-statutory purpose
basis for enforcement. Plaintiffs are entitled to the especial benefit of a
cause of action on the statute only if it was the specific intent of the legis-
lature to give it to them. In this way, the courts avoid interfering with
legislative-administrative lawmaking and enforcement discretion and,
more importantly, avoid the hopelessly difficult task of optimizing the
level of public law enforcement through principled judicial elaboration of
private rights and remedies.173
My suspicion is that Rosado-style actions have moved and will continue
to move in a similar direction. If the Court takes seriously the SM ideas
of welfare-enhancing enforcement levels and the complex interconnections
of subsidies and sanctions imbedded in inter-governmental politics, then it
is likely to produce more Pennhurst and Sea Clammers decisions. Particu-
lar instances of litigation involving claims of individual right and duty
simply will not provide an appropriate context for exercising the broad
managerial and political discretion these issues demand. As in the securi-
ties law arena, the Court may well not overturn substantial lines of au-
thority providing enforcement rights in specific programs. But over time
these exceptions may come to seem about as sensible as the apparently
permanent idea that professional baseball is not commerce for purposes of
the antitrust laws.17 4 (George Steinbrenner must pray nightly at the
shrine of stare decisis.)
On the other hand, where cases are of the "A wrongfully hit B and
should pay damages" sort, in other words, constitutional torts, the Court
is quite happy to develop causes of action by analogy to the private law.
These cases doubtless have some special features because constitutional
171. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).
172. Id. at 414-15.
173. See Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Trade-off Between the Probability and Magnitude of
Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979) (developing complex econometric model).
174. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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rights and official defendants are involved. In conventional legal parlance,
we would call them "public law" cases. But, in fact, they respond concep-
tually to the individualist model that has its roots in traditional private
law. Within that model, justiciability is relatively non-problematic.
VIII. Idealism and the Sorry Condition of Rights
The foregoing account surely has some plausibility and appeal. It be-
gins to make sense of doctrinal developments that seem rather hopelessly
confused and confusing. It puts the volume 397 cases-proxies for the
creative legal period of the 1960's and the early 1970's-in some perspec-
tive. Yet this story.may be viewed nonetheless as highly unsatisfactory
from at least two viewpoints. First, its emphasis on the gravitational pull
of intellectual models seems a throwback to pre-Realist legal conceptual-
ism, an exaltation of the logic over the life of the law. Second, the analysis
tends to ratify an impoverished conception of justiciable rights. Many
might argue that what is needed is not an apology for this sorry state of
affairs, but a new conception integrating the protection of individual
rights with the pursuit of collective ends.
To the first objection, I must surely plead nolo contendere, if not in
flagrante delicto. But let me only add a bit of avoidance to this confession.
There is no argument here that these intellectual currents are autono-
mous. Indeed, we have viewed them as connected historically to changes in
our collective political and institutional life. What is missing is either (1) a
description of the mechanism by which the ideas can be mapped onto the
social reality, or (2) a general proof of the apparent assumption that oper-
ating at the level of legal concepts will not seriously misrepresent legal
dynamics. At this point I can say only that, although far from accomplish-
ing the task, I do not despair that either of these methodologically neces-
sary components of a resuscitated legal conceptualism might be provided.
For I believe both that art mimics life and that life mimics art.
As to the second count of the indictment, I want to claim that there has
been no offense. For we would need no new conceptions of justiciable
legal rights if we believed either that our present ones were working rea-
sonably well or that reform in the "rights" direction (meaning more hear-
ing rights, more judicial review, and more implied rights of action) would
misdirect our energies. In part, it seems to me, both of these conditions
obtain. I will say why I think so very briefly, for I have no exclusive claim
to your attention or to the Law Journal's printing budget.
First, the hearing rights that the courts have recognized following
Goldberg and preserved in later cases 1"5 are far from insignificant. These
175. The large number of cases applying Goldberg hearing rights within five years of that deci-
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rights approximate the legal security available for more traditional forms
of property. The judicial recognition that state programs may be oriented
precisely to redistributional goals that can succeed only by creating "new
property" interests-interests responding largely to the individualist
model of rights-is a major improvement over older IM notions, which
threatened to exclude legislative entitlements categorically from the do-
main of recognizable property interests. That the Court does not perceive
the state as always engaged in this kind of redistributional activity is
hardly cause for alarm.
We should not forget, moreover, that most federal statutes (and their
implementing regulations) themselves provide for hearings structured to
conform to the types of programs, issues, and interests at stake in adminis-
trative decisionmaking 1 7' There is, in fact, a broad range of "hybrid"
procedures that confer both rights to participate and reasonable security of
expectations to those affected by federal action.1" Judicial reluctance to
proceduralize does not make the development of appropriate decisional
models for the administrative state stagnant. Furthermore, as Professor
Simon's paper178 (in addition to an already substantial critical literature)
suggests, "privatizing" of entitlement through adjudicatory protection
mechanisms may have complicated and untoward dynamic effects, even in
those cases where the IM perspective seems most appropriate.
Legislative creativity is similarly evident with respect to standing and
private enforcement proceedings. The general, structural legislation of the
1960's and 1970's (for example, FOIA,17 9  the Privacy Act, 80  and
NEPA181) and the major new organic regulatory statutes (FWPCA,1 8 2 the
sion are collected and discussed in Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY.
L.J. 531 (1975); see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Griswold,
The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1971).
176. Statutes commonly require a "hearing," "hearings," or an "opportunity to be heard." See,
e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(1) (1976)
(Administrator must "hold a public hearing"); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 305a, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(5)(ii) (1976) ("Administrator shall give interested persons an opportunity for the
oral presentation of data, views, or arguments . ); see 1 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA.
TISE, §§ 6:22 to 6:24 (2d ed. 1978).
177. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, § 8a, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1982);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1982); Consumer Product
Safety Act of 1972, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, § 6, 15
U.S.C. § 2605(c) (1982); see Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicabil-
ity: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1277
(1972).
178. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
179. Freedom of Information Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
180. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
181. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
182. Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
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Clean Air Act,18 3 OSHA,1 84 and CPSA, 8 5 for example) are highly atten-
tive to questions of standing and citizen enforcement as well as procedur-
ally and institutionally innovative. Only extreme judiciocentricity would
cause us to imagine that the citizens of the administrative state are playing
a shrinking role in federal policy formation and implementation. The
change is that the creative role in orchestrating state-citizen encounters is
being played by the preeminently statist-oriented institutions.
This institutional reorientation is, I think, the contemporary legal sig-
nificance of the New Deal. That era of intensely pragmatic problem-solv-
ing sought primarily to do three things: to provide a new legal framework
for labor-management relations, to restructure business competition to
eliminate its potential to destroy rather than create productive capacity,
and to redistribute and maintain purchasing power by cushioning a range
of individual risks that restrict labor market participation. In the process
of accomplishing these tasks, the New Deal reformers provided us with a
set of legal institutions and legal categories that have partially shaped
what I have called the statist model of rights.
The legislative changes that have taken place since that time reinforce
rather than reject these ideas. The civil rights movement, environmental-
ism, and consumerism move beyond groups to interests, not back towards
individualism. The causal paradigm of macroeconomics that so informed
New Deal thinking and programs is deepened and extended by the epide-
miological and ecological models that inform contemporary health and
safety legislation. Legislation and administrative regulation have prolifer-
ated along with an increasingly systemic, managerial, and professional
perspective on the development and implementation of public policy.
If these developments concern us, if we distrust legislative-administra-
tive machinery and revere market mechanisms, or if we chafe at the fail-
ure of the state apparatus fully to protect collective interests in economic
security, public health and human dignity, we would do well to address
these issues as issues of politics, not as a judicial failure to produce effec-
tive conceptions of rights. The statist model of rights seems both epiphe-
nomenal and generally appropriate to the administrative state that we
have developed. Moreover, it reminds us of a truth that no architect of
New Deal public policy was likely to forget: If we do not like the rights
that state organizational imperatives produce, we must change the organi-
zation of the state.
183. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
184. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
185. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1982).
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